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unfairness. Taxation of the entire proceeds as ordinary income
deprives the seller of his basis in the stock or assets of the business.
A partial legislative solution would be to permit capital gains
treatment of the excess of fair market value of the business"7 over
the seller's basis, and to tax the excess of the price received over
fair market value as ordinary income to the seller." Bootstrap
sales to charities would not thereby be prohibited, but exempt
organizations and other purchasers of businesses would be placed
on a more equal competitive basis. The charity would still be able
to pay a better price because of its exempt status, but the increased price would not be worth as much to the seller because
of the imposition of tax at ordinary rates on the excess received.
The seller would not be deprived of capital gains treatment on
the portion of the price received not depending on the charity's
tax status, and the Commissioner's loss of revenue would be
reduced.
Copyright Law: Broadcast of Phonograph Records Held
a "Public Performance for Profit" in Violation of
Section 1(e) Even Though Made in Connection
With Sale of the Records
The defendant owned and operated a Merchandise Mart containing a music department' in Middleton, Pennsylvania, for
which it handled all advertising. Both advertising announcements
and phonograph records were broadcast from defendant's offices
within the Mart, and on stipulated dates defendant broadcast
phonograph recordings of plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compositions over its loudspeaker system throughout the premises and
parking lot of the Mart. Plaintiffs sued for damages alleging a
violation of their exclusive right to perform their copyrighted
works publicly for profit as provided in Section 1(e) of the Copy87. If the sale in the instant case had not occurred and one of the petitioners were to die, a determination of a fair market value of the business
would have to be made for estate tax purposes. For guidelines to be used in
the determination of the fair market value of a closely held corporation, see
Rev. Rul. 59-60,1959-1 CuM. Buzz. 237.
88. The existing statute does not appear to permit this result. Therefore,
it is suggested as possible legislation.
1. The music department was leased from defendant by Mid-City Trading
Company.
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right Act? The trial court found for plaintiffs and awarded statutory damages,3 plus attorneys' fees,4 and enjoined defendant from
further performing the compositions publicly.5 The Third Circuit
affirmed, holding that the facts constituted a public performance
for profit within Section 1(e) of the Copyright Act," and that the
renditions were impermissible even if they amounted to advertisement of the recordings. Chappell & Co. v. Middletoum Farmere Mkt. & Auction Co., 334 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1964).
The facts in Chappell compelled the Third Circuit to find a
"public performance for profit" within the established construction of section 1(e). Playing records constitutes a performance
whether the defendant plays them on his own phonograph' or
relays the broadcasting of records played by others through radio
or other equipment A public performance may be to a con2.
§ 1. Exclusive rights as to copyrighted works.
Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of
this title, shall have the exclusive right:
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a
musical composition; and for the purpose of public performance for
profit ... to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of
it in any system of notation or any form of record in which the thought
of an author may be recorddd and from which it may be read or reproduced ....
17 US.C. § 1(e) (1958).
S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1958).
4. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1958).
5. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1958).
6. For similar cases see Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.d 832 (5th
Cir. 1929); Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Foullon, 79 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y.
1948), aff'd, 171 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1949); Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate
Hotel Co., 58 F. Supp. 523 (D.C. Neb. 1944), af'd, 157 F.2d 744 (8th Cir.
1946); Famous Music Corp. v. Melz, 98 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. La. 1939); Harms
v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922).
7. See Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, supra note 6; Harms Inc. v. Sansom
House Enterprises, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd sub nom.
Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc., 267 FRd 494 (3d Cir. 1959);
Buck v. Heretis, 24 F.2d 876 (E.D.S.C. 1928).
8. See Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); Society
of European Stage Authors v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1

(S.D.N.Y. 1937).

For discussions of infringement problems in conjunction with radio broadcasts or receptions, see Botsford, Some Copyright Problems of Radio Broadcasters and Receivers of Musical Compositions, 2 COPYRIGHT L. Sn'osmr
71 (1940); Gitlin, Radio Infringement of Musical Copyright, 1 COPYRIGHT L.

Symosarm 61 (1939).
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stantly shifting audience; 9 it need not reach a group gathered
together in a contained area.o Finally, to be for profit the performance need not provide direct pecuniary benefit to the defendant; it is enough that a commercially attractive atmosphere
is created." Thus a "public performance for profit" within section
1(e) includes any playing of a copyrighted record from which
commercial benefit may derive.
Defendant maintained that even if a public performance for
profit was found, the broadcasts advertised the records and
therefore did not violate section 1(e). The trial court did not
determine to what extent advertising value resulted from the
9. See Society of European Stage Authors v. New York Hotel Statler Co.,
supra note 8. Other court decisions have defined public to include private
dining and drinking clubs which are open to anyone who will pay a nominal
membership fee. See Lerner v. Schectman, 228 F. Supp. 354 (D. Minn. 1964);
M. Witmark & Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787
(D. Mass. 1960); Lerner v. Club Wander In, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 781 (D. Mass.
1959).

10. See Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5
F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925).
11.
If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a performance where money is taken at the door they are very imperfectly
protected. . . . The defendants' performances are not eleemosynary.

They are part of a total for which the public pays, and the fact that
the price of the whole is attributed to a particular item which those
present are expected to order, is not important. . . . If music did not
pay it would be given up. If it pays it pays out of the public's pocket.
Whether it pays or not the purpose of employing it is profit and that
is enough.
Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1917).
Courts following the rule in Herbert have found profit seeking performances in restaurants, e.g., Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.
1929); nightclubs, e.g., Lerner v. Club Wander In, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 731 (D.
Mass. 1959); hotels, e.g., Buck v. Coe, 32 F. Supp. 829 (M.D. Pa. 1940); ballrooms, e.g., Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 86 F.2d
354 (7th Cir. 1929); theatres, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement
Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E.D.S.C. 1924), aff'd, 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924); radio
stations, e.g., Associated Music Publishers Inc. v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund
Inc., 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1944); M. Witmark & Sons v. Bamberger & Co.,
291 Fed. 776 (D.C.N.J. 1923). In the Debs case the radio station was a nonprofit organization which had accepted advertisements for one-third of its
programs.
For discussions of the expanded scope of public performance construction
since Herbert v. Shanley see 5 COPYRIGHT L. Syroswn 256 (1954), 3 CopyRIGHT L. Symrosium 53 (1940), 5 J. MLAnsHALL L.Q. 278 (1939), 35 Miss.
L. REv. 295 (1964).
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broadcasts; the appellate court noted that the renditions may
have performed two functions: record sales promotion and entertainment of Mart customers. Determination of the primary purpose was unnecessary, however, in light of the court's determination that "Sections 1 (e) and 27 of the Copyright Act do not
authorize the public performance for profit of a copyrighted
musical composition even in connection with the sale of a mechanical reproduction of the work."'
This suggestion that the advertising benefit to the composer
does not exempt the performance from the stricture of section
1(e), even if the primary purpose of the performance is to sell the
particular record, is alarming. The language of section 1(e) may
be broad enough to cover record broadcasts in a music store or
music department of a larger store, a broadcast solely within a
store selling only records, and a broadcast in a record booth for
a potential customer. Policy considerations indicate that in at
least some of these situations, the literal language of section 1(e)
should not be stretched to the limits suggested by Chappell.
Although not litigated, playing a record for a customer in a
booth probably would be a "public performance for profit." Arguably if the customer plays the record himself there is not a performance by the dealer. The dealer, however, provides the environment, equipment, and the inducement for the performance.
In analagous situations the provider has been found liable." In
that the performance is for a single listener, the claim may be
made that this is not "public" within the terms of section 1(e).
As judicially interpreted, however, "public" means that the public have an opportunity to hear, not that they actually hear;
and as the record booth is available to any customer, the performance is arguably public. The seller's primary reason for
encouraging the playing is to sell the record, hence the profit
element is obvious.
The extension of section 1(e) to the prepurchase performance
seems undesirable as both an unnecessary restraint on sales efforts and a negation of statutory licensing purposes. In the record
booth situation the sole reason for the performance is to induce
the customer to purchase the recording. The performance directly
12. 334 F.2d at 805. This argument was first presented in M. Witmark
& Sons v. Bamberger & Co., supra note 11, and was again raised and rejected
in Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922).
18. See 64 CoLuM. L. REV. 355 (1964) and cases cited therein.
14. See cases cited in notes 9 & 10 supra.
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benefits only the seller and copyright holder and others with
interests in that record. A copyright holder might want to restrict
the playing of his copyrighted work where profits from different
recordings varied. Thus, if the copyright holder received more
than two cents for each record sold, he would prefer sales of that
copy over sales of recordings for which he received only the two
cents provided by statute." Allowing the copyright holder to
discriminate would hinder the operation of the compulsory licensing provisions of section 1(e). The public would be deprived of
the expanded exposure of the copyrighted work, which the licensing provision contemplates. Furthermore, the stimulus for competition in the record industry, which the licensing provision was
intended to provide, would be lessened."
.The record department and record store broadcasts lie somewhere between the Chappell situation, in which the broadcaster
receives most of the benefit, and the record booth situation, in
which the copyright holder clearly receives all the benefit to which
he is entitled. The performance right given the copyright holder
in section 1(e) is designed to preserve for him commercial benefits
derived from the performance of his work. The literal language
of the act applies to both situations. But the commercial benefit
to the broadcaster as compared with the composer is greater in
the case of the record department than in the record store situation. Record department broadcasts may stimulate sales of a
wide variety of goods; record store broadcasts, however, promote
the sale of records solely. In viewing copyright holders as a class,
they receive from record store broadcasts all the commercial
benefit that section 1(e) seems designed to provide them; while
the copyright holder is not solely benefited by such a broadcast
of his record, it promotes the sale of other copyright holder's
records and broadcast of their records may similarly benefit him.
15.
And as a condition of extending the copyright control to such mechanical reproductions, that whenever the owner of a musical copyright
has used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the use of the copyrighted work upon the parts of instruments serving to reproduce
mechanically the musical work, any other person may make similar
use of the copyrighted work upon the payment to the copyright proprietor of a royalty of 2 cents on each such part manufactured, to be
paid by the manufacturer thereof . . . .

Copyright Act, 17 TJ.S.C. § 1(e) (1958).
16. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Committees on Patents of Senate and
House of Representatives on Pending Bills To Amend and Consolidate the
Acts Respecting Copyright, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 247 (1908).

